Twentieth Century Chronicle

Page 216

With Tamura's negotiation and the successful compromise from the Army on the issue of troop reduction, he now had the power to truly suppress any doubts about his abilities. After all, in the Navy's eyes, being able to make the Army bow down to the Navy was a demonstration of ability.

He originally thought that the exchange with Tamura would not go so smoothly. After all, the army's dominance over the navy was not just a slogan, but a reality since the establishment of the Meiji Restoration government. The fact that the army, which had always disregarded the navy, could make concessions to the navy was a remarkable victory.

Therefore, on the way back, Togo was clearly in much higher spirits. He said to Hayashi Shinichi, "In this way, the problem of military downsizing has finally been resolved. Now the navy can truly grasp the direction of national policy, right?"

For Lin Xinyi, Togo Masamichi's optimism was clearly premature. Even if the navy could temporarily grasp the direction of national policy, its status could not be guaranteed as long as the Asian cooperation mechanism was not established, and it might even fall back down.

After all, before a new Asian order is established, various parties in the Japanese political circle may not always stand with the Navy. Even the Navy itself may not be able to persist if the Asian cooperation mechanism cannot bring real benefits to Japan.

Of course, Togo's optimism wasn't without its merits; only if all parties expressed optimism about the prospects of Asian cooperation could this direction be sustained. Therefore, he wouldn't dampen Togo's enthusiasm, but simply echoed his sentiments with a few words.

Unlike Togo Masamichi, who was relaxed, Tamura's mind was working at full capacity after leaving the ryotei (traditional Japanese restaurant). By the time he arrived at Asada Nobuoki's residence, he was absolutely certain that his suspicions about the navy's ambitions were correct. He truthfully told Asada his suspicions, which greatly surprised Asada. Although he had tried to overthrow the Choshu faction, he did not intend to see the army decline.

"So what do you plan to do? The Navy has such great ambitions, should we continue to cooperate with them?" Asada asked Tamura with some unease.

This is why Tamura maintained close ties with Asada, while keeping a certain distance from Nagaoka Gaishi, another key member of the Getsuyoukai. Asada Nobuyuki trusted him completely, while Nagaoka trusted his teacher, Kodama, even more.

Tamura had already sorted out his thoughts on the way there, so he confidently answered Asada's question: "By studying the Navy's ambitions, I've gained a clearer understanding of how to modify the continental policy. It's about competing with the Navy for leadership of Asian security organizations, rather than continuing with the previous military solution of conquering the continent..."

Chapter 700

Chapter 700

On November 13, 1908, Army Chief of Staff Tamura was transferred to the position of Minister of the Army. In his inaugural speech, Tamura did not express his determination to preserve the army's structure, but rather emphasized the importance of remembering the original aspirations of the army's founding. He also devoted a great deal of time to praising the important role that Takasugi and Ōmura played in the establishment of the army, believing that without their contributions, there would be no army as it is today.

Tamura's inaugural speech sparked debate within the army. Initially, the army was not concerned about who would succeed him as minister, but rather about the new minister's stance on disarmament. However, Tamura's speech broke this consensus and ignited a discussion about who the true founder of the current army really is.

For the current Choshu faction, Tamura's praise of Takasugi and Ōmura is utterly baffling. The army system was established by Yamagata, and Takasugi and Ōmura are not really relevant to the army today. In fact, Tamura himself is more qualified to be called the founder of the army than these two predecessors, since Tamura was responsible for translating the Prussian military system.

However, due to the political situation, the Choshu faction could only criticize Tamura's inaugural speech in private, believing that he was neglecting his duties. After all, Tamura's main task as minister was to solve the problem of military downsizing, not to determine the origins of the army.

However, Tamura's speech received considerable support from both pro-Chōshū and anti-Chōshū military personnel.

After the death of Admiral Kodama, the Pan-Chōshū faction fell into chaos. Although Akiyama Yoshifuru, Nagaoka Gaishi, and Tamura managed to maintain the situation, Akiyama Yoshifuru's seniority ultimately failed to win over the masses, Nagaoka lacked leadership skills, and Tamura struggled to gain the approval of people from Chōshū. Therefore, the Pan-Chōshū faction was essentially bankrupt in terms of political ideology, as no one could replace Kodama as the leader who could unite people from Chōshū and non-Chōshū.

At this time of wavering morale, Tamura's inaugural speech on the origins of the army set a new standard for the Choshu faction, namely that the army was a civilian army developed based on Yoshida Shoin's theory of grassroots rise, and was not the same as the samurai army of the past. The Choshu faction should unite under this standard to continue to reform the army.

For those soldiers who opposed the Choshu faction, Tamura's historical origins of the civilian army were essentially a denial of the imperial army advocated by Yamagata Genro.

What is the Emperor-system army? In essence, it is just a variation of the samurai system. Officers pledge allegiance to the Emperor and then gain the Emperor's trust and be given important positions. Officers are loyal to the Emperor, not the country. This is the same as the loyalty of samurai to their lord.

Although some officers who opposed the Emperor system were expelled from the military during the military reforms, not all of the officers who had lived through the late Edo period were dead. They did not entirely agree with unconditional loyalty to the Emperor. Some of them believed that the status of the state should be higher than that of the Emperor, or that the army could only be unconditionally loyal to the Emperor if the Emperor's interests were aligned with those of the state.

This kind of thinking is a remnant of the ideas of the Meiji Restoration leaders during the anti-shogunate coalition era. Regardless of whether the anti-shogunate coalition was under the banner of "respecting the emperor and expelling the barbarians" or regarded the shogunate as the greatest enemy of the country, in reality, the anti-shogunate coalition did not have much respect for the emperor. Their purpose in overthrowing the shogunate was to transform Japan and prevent it from falling into the same fate as India.

The political chaos during the first decade of the Meiji Restoration stemmed from the fact that the Emperor did not play a significant role in politics. Each political faction relied on its own power rather than the Emperor's support to promote its own political ideals.

After the Satsuma Rebellion, the Meiji Restoration government was severely weakened by internal strife, and it was only then that the Choshu faction, including Ito and Yamagata, brought out the Emperor to salvage the situation, turning the Emperor into a political stabilizer.

Yamagata Aritomo's concept of an army under the Emperor's rule was actually based on his awareness that he could not have the prestige of Takasugi, Saigo, and others to gain the complete trust of the army. Therefore, he brought up the Emperor as the spiritual faith of the army.

But as Tamura said in his speech about the history of the army, the current army originated from the theory of grassroots rise. It is a civilian army that is different from the samurai army of the past. If we forget this, the army will lose its foundation.

For military personnel opposed to the Choshu faction, Tamura's inaugural speech essentially articulated the claim that the army had ushered in the Meiji Restoration era, rather than the Choshu faction establishing the current army on the Emperor's orders.

Yamagata Aritomo is regarded as the father of the army by the Choshu faction because the Choshu faction believes that the current army has little to do with the anti-shogunate coalition. The anti-shogunate coalition has become history with Saigo Takamori's rebellion. The current army was rebuilt by Yamagata Genro under the order of the Emperor in order to defend the country.

In other words, the imperial army advocated by the Choshu faction was essentially an attempt to sever ties with the leaders of the anti-shogunate coalition that ultimately rebelled against the imperial court, in order to prove that the newly established army was completely loyal to the emperor, since it had no ideological connection with the former anti-shogunate coalition.

However, the Choshu faction's propositions had a stabilizing effect on the situation for a short period after the Satsuma Rebellion. After that period, the Choshu faction's claim of a new army under the Emperor's rule became a political reason for the Choshu faction to control the army, which aroused dissatisfaction among non-Choshu faction soldiers.

In his first speech as newly appointed minister, Tamura openly declared that the current army and the anti-shogunate coalition, especially the Choshu Kiheitai within the coalition, were of the same lineage. This was tantamount to denying Yamagata Genro's claim that the army was reorganized according to the Emperor's orders.

Yamagata Genro merely improved upon the army's system based on the work of Takasugi and Ōmura; he was not the ideological founder of the army.

This naturally resonated with these anti-Chōshū faction soldiers. They had long harbored resentment towards the Chōshū faction for using the banner of disobeying the Emperor to suppress them. However, because the Chōshū faction had tied the Emperor to themselves, opposing the Chōshū faction was tantamount to opposing Yamagata Genrō, and opposing Yamagata Genrō was tantamount to opposing the Emperor. This made them hesitant to confront the Chōshū faction head-on.

Now that Tamura has jumped out to use Yoshida Shoin's theory of the rise of outlaws to refute the theory of the imperial army, he has naturally won the support of these anti-Chōshū faction members. As for the non-Yamagata faction of the Chōshū faction, for the sake of the historical origins of the Chōshū faction, they will not oppose Tamura's statement. After all, Ito and Yamagata just lived longer; they were not the founders of the Chōshū faction.

Those who were truly dissatisfied with Tamura's inaugural address were only the mainstream Choshu faction, such as Katsura Taro and Terauchi Masatake. Although they believed that Yamagata was too old to lead the Choshu faction forward, their authority came from the imperial military ideology established by Yamagata. Once this ideology was rejected, they would naturally be unable to continue to represent the emperor in ruling the army and military as Yamagata's successors.

Under the ideology of the Emperor-led military system, leading the army is not based on personal ability but on the Emperor's trust. So who can gain the Emperor's trust?

The Choshu faction, by controlling the Emperor's military aides, established an image of close relationship with the Emperor by having access to him and gaining his favor. Soldiers outside the Choshu faction had no way to get close to the Emperor, so how could they be expected to gain his trust?

Therefore, Katsura Taro and Terauchi Masatake were able to secure their positions in the army by relying on the concept of an army under the emperor's rule, and naturally they would not oppose the concept of an army under the emperor's rule proposed by Yamagata.

Therefore, Tamura's inaugural speech was like a fishbone stuck in the throat for Katsura Taro and Terauchi Masatake. Terauchi complained to Katsura Taro, "Does Tamura feel he has no way out of being a scapegoat, so he's just giving up? What is he trying to achieve by giving a speech like that?"

Although Katsura Taro also harbored resentment towards Tamura, he knew that it was unfair to make Tamura take the blame for the military's retreat. It would be strange if Tamura didn't feel any resentment at all.

But at this moment, he could only force himself to remain calm and reassure the people in the temple, saying, "No matter what he wants to do, as long as he accepts the military downsizing, the army will no longer be able to accept him sitting in the minister's position, and he won't be able to accomplish anything. Let's just wait and see, the results will come out soon."

Despite the undercurrents within the army, the Yamamoto cabinet did not collapse politically with the appointment of Tamura as the new Minister of the Army.

On November 15, Prime Minister Yamamoto met with the Chinese Minister to Tokyo and expressed his views on East Asian peace, stating that Japan and China should make joint efforts for East Asian peace.

Yamamoto Gonbei's theory of East Asian peace quickly received a positive response from the Beijing government.

On November 18, when interviewed by reporters, Yuan Shikai, Chairman of the State Council, highly praised Prime Minister Yamamoto's views on peace in East Asia, and said that China would actively consult with Japan on the issue of peaceful development between the two countries in order to reduce misunderstandings between the two sides on their respective defense claims.

The statements made by the leaders of the Japanese and Chinese governments on the East Asian peace issue have been perceived by the outside world as an image of the two countries rapidly aligning themselves, which has quickly attracted the attention of diplomats from countries such as Britain and the United States. For British and American diplomats in China, with the failure of Russia's expansion in the Far East, the East Asian order is in the process of restoring balance.

However, the balance of power in East Asia as seen by British and American diplomats is not the same as the peace in East Asia advocated by the elites of Japan and China. For British and American diplomats, the essence of the balance of power in East Asia lies in the confrontation between Japan and China after Russia's withdrawal from the region. Britain and the United States will stand on the side of the large and weak China in the confrontation between Japan and China in order to counter Japan's political and military pressure on China, thereby gaining political and economic benefits in China at a very low cost.

Why are only British and American diplomats seeking a rebalancing in East Asia? Because Germany and France do not endorse this East Asian order. For Germany, breaking the East Asian balance and creating hostility between China and Europe is the way to alleviate German pressure in Europe. France, on the other hand, is in a state of schizophrenia. French diplomats in Asia follow the British and American balance of power diplomacy to prevent the southward expansion of great powers after East Asian peace, while Paris hopes that East Asia will remain peaceful to prevent it from spiraling out of control and thus attracting British and American political and military power, thereby reducing attention to the situation in Europe.

Therefore, the political rapprochement between Japan and China is a dangerous signal for British and American diplomats in China, as it means that their envisioned postwar balance of power order in East Asia is impossible to achieve.

The reconciliation between Japan and China means that the UK and the US can no longer use their respective powers to restrain each other. This means that if the UK and the US want to do anything in East Asia, they will need to use their own power. However, given the current situation in Europe, the UK and the US cannot do so, since Europe is the center of the world order compared to East Asia.

Although British and American diplomats in China are aligned on China policy, their political influence on China is vastly different. American diplomats in China can only act as Britain's subordinates on China issues, and without Britain, they cannot exert any influence on Chinese politics.

The handling of the Boxer Rebellion illustrates this point. Only after gaining the support of the British did the US Minister to China dare to issue a strong diplomatic note to the Qing Dynasty. The subsequent principle of unity among the great powers was also achieved under the strong impetus of the US Minister to China.

Following the Boxer Rebellion, the antagonism between Germany and France intensified, and the United States could no longer choose sides between Germany and France. Consequently, the unified structure of the great powers in the Far East collapsed. Although the diplomatic missions of the great powers in China nominally maintained the principle of unified deliberation, in reality, they no longer had the support of the governments of the various countries and relied purely on private contacts between their diplomats in China.

As cooperation between Wuhan and Germany deepened, the German minister to China completely lost interest in the principle of unity among the great powers. The French said that German diplomats in the diplomatic corps had practically become representatives of the Chinese. Although the Americans echoed the French view, they also quickly established private contacts with Wuhan and were not as enthusiastic about supporting the principle of unity among the great powers as before.

Therefore, the countries that most supported the principle of unity among the great powers in the diplomatic missions of the great powers in China at that time were actually Britain and France. However, Britain and the United States were in agreement on the balance of power in East Asia. This effectively declared the bankruptcy of the order of the great powers in China established after the Boxer Protocol, which at one time protected the interests of all countries in China.

According to Sir John Jordan, the British Minister to China, the Order of Nations in China established in 1901 was actually most beneficial to the interests of all countries and Britain. Through this order, the powers could force the Chinese to uphold the treaties at minimal cost, while Britain could also gain enormous influence over Chinese politics as a mediator between China and other countries.

However, the selfishness of the Germans destroyed the principle of unity among the great powers, and the rapprochement between Japan and China further undermined the foundation of this unity. Without a military threat to China, the unity of the great powers could not become a decisive factor in Chinese politics.

What has always threatened the Chinese has never been the direct invasion of the great powers, but rather the threats from their neighbors: first Russia, and now Japan.

The Eight-Nation Alliance incident has actually proven one thing: a powerful land power that does not border China cannot destroy China, because China's population and land area cannot be swallowed up all at once; it can only be weakened through repeated wars.

Among the Eight-Nation Alliance, the strongest army in Europe, the German army, only managed to advance from Beijing to the Taihang Mountains, without even breaking through the border of Shanxi Province. This was achieved with the support of the Royal Navy in providing logistical support for the German army.

Therefore, after the Eight-Nation Alliance invasion, the Germans, who had great ambitions for China, also lost their desire to conquer China. This was because the Germans realized that completely dismantling China's politics would only benefit the Russians. In fact, it was the Chinese army that protected Germany's colonies in Shandong, rather than Germany truly controlling Shandong.

The Chinese government lost its ability to govern, while the Russians could send a steady stream of troops to the Far East via the railway, then move from outside the Great Wall into the interior, ultimately forcing Germany to leave Shandong, because Germany was simply no match for the Russian army, which relied on railway logistics.

Similarly, the Japanese army could pose a threat to the Shandong region by securing sea transport routes. Faced with Japan, which could mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops, the Germans could only manage to transport tens of thousands of people to the Far East, and that was only possible if the British Royal Navy did not interfere.

Therefore, after the Boxer Rebellion, only Russia and Japan remained with a strong desire for Chinese territory, and after the war, only Japan remained. Thus, for Britain to exploit Chinese fear for diplomatic gain, Sino-Japanese hostility was a necessary condition. This explains why British public opinion shifted later in the war, heavily criticizing the Japanese army's brutality against the Chinese during their operations in Manchuria.

It can be said that the British newspapers, which had consistently portrayed the Japanese army as righteous in the later stages of the war, changed their stance from protecting Japanese soldiers during the Sino-Japanese War. For example, they defended the massacre perpetrated by the Japanese army in Port Arthur, and even went so far as to say that the massacre was fabricated and was merely a Chinese propaganda tactic. Now, they vehemently criticized the Japanese army's brutal acts, such as indiscriminately killing locals, raping women, and looting food, and expressed sympathy for the anti-Japanese armed forces spontaneously organized by the Chinese in Manchuria.

While the United States boasts the most diverse range of newspapers among all countries, the most authoritative political newspapers in Europe are found in Britain. Elites from various nations seeking to understand the world inevitably rely on major British newspapers, and the same applies to Chinese political elites. Even some foreign newspapers published in China use English rather than Chinese.

Therefore, the British criticism of the Japanese military's actions did indeed arouse resentment towards the Japanese among some Chinese elites, especially some Chinese intellectuals who sympathized with the Koreans. They believed that the Japanese had great ambitions and that after annexing Korea, they would inevitably target Chinese territory. Therefore, China should be wary of Japan's similar tactics used in Manchuria to occupy the Korean Peninsula.

The wariness of Chinese intellectuals towards Japan was seen by London as the ideological foundation for the balance of power in East Asia. However, under such circumstances, the leaders of Japan and China exchanged views on East Asian peace, which was clearly unexpected by London. As a result, London began to feel dissatisfied with the work of Jordan, the Minister to China.

Chapters 701-750

Chapter 701

Chapter 701

　For Japan, this war against Russia was the first war that formally propelled it into the ranks of the great powers. Through its victories in naval and land battles against Russia, Japan demonstrated its ability to hinder the free action of a European power in East Asia. As a result, European powers would have to take Japan's position into account in their future diplomacy in East Asia. This is a fundamental principle since the establishment of the Treaty of Westphalia in Europe: the interests of great powers cannot be violated.

The conclusion Europeans drew from the Thirty Years' War was that war would inevitably break out if the interests of great powers were violated, and once such a war broke out, it was difficult to stop it unilaterally. In order to avoid unnecessary wars between great powers, agreements were established to define the boundaries of the interests of great powers.

Japan's land battles were not particularly impressive to Europeans. Even the British, who were generally considered to have little to offer in terms of army strength, did not think that the Japanese had anything remarkable to offer in land battles. The Japanese army was practically a second-rate European army, and once it lost its weapons resources from Europe, it could not sustain a war of attrition with the Russian army on the battlefield.

For European countries, the most fearless tactic in war with Eastern countries was this kind of attrition warfare, especially for the British and French. They could turn the vast population of their colonies into cannon fodder on the battlefield, and then use their own industrial capacity to wear down a copy of the Japanese army.

In contrast, while the Wuhan army was far inferior to the Japanese army in terms of organization and training, it was its ability to politically convert its adversaries that truly troubled and frightened the British. Not only did the colonial vassal armies gravitate towards Wuhan, but even the Slavic people of Russia sided with Wuhan, attempting to fight their way back to Europe and establish a genuine republic.

Therefore, Britain and France were increasing their efforts to suppress Yuan Shikai's Beiyang clique and the revolutionaries in the south in order to prevent the rapid fall of Chinese power into the hands of Wuhan. In the face of tensions in Europe, neither Britain nor France wanted another anti-imperialist Asian national unity movement to erupt in East Asia, especially since newspapers in Wuhan had openly raised this point.

Although Britain, France, and other countries protested to Beijing and Wuhan, Wuhan stated that this was a matter of freedom of speech, and the government had no right to interfere with the people's speech. Moreover, the slogan of resisting tyranny was raised during the French Revolution, not created by the Chinese. The ideas of the French Revolution were circulating among the Chinese people. Countries should protest to the French Republic first, not to the Chinese people. The French Republic itself has not purged the republicans to restore the monarchy, so what right does it have to criticize others?

Because the Wuhan army demonstrated remarkable fighting power in foreign wars, local Chinese forces lost confidence in confronting Wuhan. Even with the support of foreign powers, these local forces tended to protect themselves rather than provoke Wuhan.

After all, when Wuhan helped the revolutionary groups in Nanjing defeat the local Manchu forces with a small force, everyone realized that without strength, verbal attacks on Wuhan would not cause any damage to Wuhan, but would instead easily provoke Wuhan to take action. The so-called protection of the foreign powers was actually useless in front of the Wuhan army. The foreigners were also bullies who bullied the weak and feared the strong.

After the Nanjing Mutiny, although the foreign powers made a show of sending warships, they ultimately did not dare to use force to restore the status quo in the Yangtze River after threatening to blockade it with mines in Wuhan.

Of course, this was also related to the fact that the Qing dynasty was no longer able to maintain its rule. Most of the gentry in the Jiangnan region were constitutionalists, and a few even joined the revolution directly. The real royalists were almost all small landlords who had not yet squeezed into the ranks of the gentry.

There is a difference between landlords and gentry. A family that has not produced a prefect or higher-ranking official for several generations cannot be called a prominent local family, that is, a gentry with local influence.

As for small landlords, with their intelligence and a certain amount of opportunity, they can still transform from rich peasants into landlords. However, although these small landlords have some land and money, they have little say in the local area. This is the difference between nouveau riche and local gentry.

The speculative mentality of small landowners always leads them to think of making big gains with small investments. When the court is in a bad situation, they bet on the court, hoping that the court will improve and they will get a huge return.

However, most of these opportunistic landlords who were loyal to the imperial court came from remote mountain villages. They were completely unaware of the changes in the outside world. They only knew that the imperial court was powerful and had conquered China, a country with hundreds of millions of people, with only a few hundred thousand. During the Taiping Rebellion, they lost half of the country but still managed to turn the tide. Therefore, they thought that the same thing would happen this time. After all, since the Wuhan Uprising, no one had ever proposed a northern expedition to overthrow the imperial court.

When the Qing emperor abdicated, everyone said that Yuan Shikai betrayed the Qing Dynasty, rather than that Wuhan destroyed the Qing Dynasty. Therefore, many small, isolated places still believed that the real power lay with the Beiyang clique that inherited the imperial territory, rather than the Wuhan Workers' Party, which could never take control of Beijing.

For this reason, some small landowners believed that the current imperial court still held power, so they naturally tried to show Beijing that they were loyal to Beijing and irreconcilably opposed to Wuhan.

Of course, these small landlords also placed their bets on Beijing because the Wuhan Workers' Party was actively promoting land reform, which was fundamentally opposed to their interests. They did not want their hard-earned wealth to vanish, so they had no choice but to resist. And the only force that could lead them against Wuhan was the Beiyang government.

However, as the de facto rulers of the local areas, the gentry were quite familiar with the situation in both their hometowns and the imperial court. In particular, the gentry in Jiangnan began to send their children abroad to study after the imperial examinations were abolished, so they even became familiar with the situation abroad.

Based on this information, the gentry concluded that although the series of policies promoted in Wuhan had harmed the interests of the landlords, they were in line with the trend of global progress in terms of developing industry.

Because none of the great powers were not industrialized, especially after Russia was defeated, the idea that a lack of industrial power would prevent the country from defending itself had become a consensus among these elites.

Therefore, although the gentry disliked the series of political and economic policies proposed by Wuhan, they had to admit that although these economic policies harmed the interests of property owners, they were a good medicine for the country.

The only problem is who will own the country once it stands up again. Therefore, apart from a few stubborn old fogies who can no longer keep up with the times, the gentry tend to agree with the political and economic policies implemented in Wuhan. They just ask that Wuhan should reserve a place for them in this transformation.

The gentry in the Jiangnan region came into contact with foreign powers earlier than gentry in other places, and naturally their thinking was more open.

In fact, the reason why Hunan's intellectual elites stood at the forefront of the revolution in modern times, while Hunan's landlords were among the most conservative in the country, was that the Hunan clique controlled the Jiangnan bureaucratic system for a long time after the Taiping Rebellion. This resulted in many Hunan gentry children receiving their education in Jiangnan, which contrasted sharply with the conservative atmosphere of the local Hunan landlords.

Therefore, in the Nanjing Mutiny, the local gentry mostly stood by and watched as the Qing dynasty's power in Jiangnan waned. Except for a few officials who resisted the rebels out of loyalty to the court, they were quickly stripped of their power by local forces and sent out of the country. On the surface, they voluntarily resigned and returned home, refusing to work for the rebels.

However, in the struggle for power after the mutiny, the local gentry did not give up easily. At one point, some of them contacted the foreign powers, hoping to create a situation of local autonomy.

However, Wuhan did not attempt to centralize power. Instead, it voluntarily allowed local revolutionary groups autonomy and agreed to adjust and implement a series of policies for Wuhan. This dispelled the ambitions of these people. After all, inviting foreign powers to intervene would come at a high price. Before Wuhan confronted them, these gentry were unwilling to take that step, because if the two sides went to war and the area was devastated, their local reputation would be ruined.

Therefore, the Nanjing Mutiny and its aftermath served as a warning to local forces.

One reason is that opposition to Wuhan shouldn't be too high-profile, as it could easily provoke attacks from Wuhan.

One reason is that the foreign powers posed a great threat to the imperial court, but they actually posed little threat to Wuhan.

Lastly, there are quite a few people around me who are inclined towards change. Compared to the people of Wuhan, these people really want to kill your whole family.

Therefore, as the East Asian war entered its later stages, the British discovered that their influence in China seemed to have regressed to what it was before the Boxer Rebellion.

Before the Boxer Rebellion, foreign powers could only exert influence over the central government of the Qing Dynasty, and local officials largely responded to their instructions by stalling for time. After the Boxer Rebellion, the Qing central government completely submitted to the foreign powers. At this point, even an ordinary foreigner could get local officials to adjudicate cases according to their own demands, because if the foreigner was dissatisfied, the court could dismiss those officials.

However, as the East Asian War entered its later stages, the Qing emperor peacefully abdicated, and a new republican system was established. At this time, China's nominal capital was Beijing, but in reality, it had shifted from a centralized system to a federal system, led by the Beiyang and Wuhan military and political forces, with local forces in each province exercising autonomy, thus forming the current Chinese republican system.

At this time, Beijing's power to appoint and dismiss local officials was greatly restricted. For example, Yuan Shikai was the Chairman of the State, but in reality, he could only appoint and dismiss officials in the territory controlled by the Beiyang Army and within the Beiyang Army system.

As for the appointment and removal of personnel in other provinces and local military units, they almost always involve reports from various localities, which are then signed and approved by the State Council. This is a formal power of appointment and removal, but no actual power of appointment and removal.

For example, Tian Junyi, the leader of the Wuhan Workers' Party, held no government position, only the title of Chairman of the Wuhan Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Committee. However, Wuhan's military and political officials obeyed his orders, making them far more effective than the State Council decrees signed by Yuan Shikai. Under such circumstances, it became less effective for ordinary foreigners to assert their privileges as subjects of foreign powers, as they could not find anyone accountable to them. This meant that the privileges of foreign powers in China lacked enforcers.

That's why Jordan believed that British diplomacy in China had regressed to the level before 1900, and that Britain could only maintain its interests in China by exerting influence on the upper-class elites, rather than by directly maintaining its privileges in China through the bureaucratic system of the Qing Dynasty as before.

When Sir John Jordan was recommended as Minister to China in 1906, he confidently told London that the Chinese problem would not be difficult to solve, and that as long as the powerful figures in China could be won over, the anti-imperialist sentiments within China could be suppressed.

Jordan's view of a powerful figure in China referred to Yuan Shikai. For diplomats of the great powers, the Beiyang Army was established right under their noses, and Yuan Shikai's neutrality during the Boxer Rebellion ensured that he was friendly to the powers and a force capable of ruling China as their friend.

It was precisely because of the Beiyang Army's friendly attitude towards the foreign powers that the powers supported Yuan Shikai, enabling the Beiyang Army to obtain weapons and instructors from Europe.

Because diplomats from the great powers in China disdained dealing with the Chinese, even the diplomats who claimed to know the most about China would simply send their Chinese servants to the streets to listen to what the Chinese were talking about, and then shamelessly boast about how well they understood the situation in China.

Therefore, until the Wuhan army marched north to fight the Russian army, Jordan believed that the Beiyang Army was superior to the Wuhan army. As for the Wuhan army's victory over the British army in Tibet, he thought it was due to the incompetence of the Indians, and that if the Beiyang Army had been in charge, those Indians would have fled as well. However, the performance of the two armies in this war greatly surprised diplomats in China.

Jordan did not expect such a large gap between the Beiyang Army and the Wuhan Army. He thought it was normal for the Beiyang Army to be unable to defeat the Russian Army. After all, the Beiyang Army had only been learning the European military system for a short time, while the Russians had been fighting with European countries for hundreds of years, so of course they would be better at fighting.

However, the Wuhan army, which he considered inferior to the Beiyang Army, performed exceptionally well in the war, repeatedly defeating the Russian army. Even European military observers believed that the Wuhan army was a force to be reckoned with, even on the European battlefield. Although the army was somewhat lacking in training, its ability to learn warfare in battle was outstanding.

These European military observers were not offering flattery, but rather drawing a conclusion after observing the battles between the Russian army, the Wuhan army, and the Japanese army. Although the Japanese army gained a certain advantage in the early stages by launching a surprise landing in Liaodong, the Russian army did not have much fear of the Japanese army. Their resentment towards their own commanders outweighed their anger towards the Japanese army.

In fact, the Russian and Japanese armies did not suffer too many losses in large-scale positional warfare, but they were reluctant to attack Japanese positions because the incompetent command of their commanders almost always sent them to their deaths.